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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court properly convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings and apply the proper standard? 
2. Did the defendants have a duty to conduct a groundwater survey and create 
a groundwater plan in the Pahvant Valley in 1992 to 1996 or did they exceed their 
authority? 
3. Having determined to conduct a groundwater survey in the Pahvant Valley, 
did the defendants have an obligation to the Tuttles to conduct the survey in a non-
negligent manner? 
4. Were the defendants estopped from contradicting the 1996 groundwater 
survey? 
5. Was the Tuttles' notice of claim timely? 
6. Did the trial court err in dismissing the Tuttles5 takings and estoppel claims? 
All of these issues were decided by the trial court on a motion to dismiss, which the 
trial court treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The standard of review for 
both issues is correctness. See Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co.. 910 P.2d 1218, 
1220 (Utah 1996) (standard of review for motion to dismiss is correctness); Miller v. 
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Gastronomy, Inc., 2005 U T App. 80, ^[6, 110 P.3d 144 (standard of review for motion for 
judgment on the pleadings is correctness). 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE LAWS 
1. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 
a. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); 
b. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). 
2. Groundwater Survey and Groundwater Plan. 
a. The Tuttles have been unable to locate any determinative law on this 
issue, which appears to be a matter of first impression. 
3. Negligent Survey. 
a. Nelson ex rel. Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 
1996); 
b. Brinkerhoff v. Salt Lake City. 13 Utah 2d 214, 371 P.2d211 (Utah 
1962). 
4. Estoppel. 
a. Mendez v. Department of Social Services. 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 
(Utah App. 1991). 
5. Notice of Claim. 
a. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-121; 
!The Legislature repealed the Utah Governmental Immunity Act during its 2004 
general session and replaced it with the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. See Laws 
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b. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11(1); 
c. Bank One Utah v. West Jordan City. 2002 U T App. 271, ^ 8, 54 
P.3d 135. 
6. Estoppel and Takings Claims. 
a. Bowles v. State ex. rel. Dept. of Transportation, 652 P.2d 1345, 1346 
(Utah 1982); 
b. El Rancho Enters.. Inc.. v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778, 779 
(Utah 1977); 
c. Colman v. State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622, 634 (Utah 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of water rights in the Pahvant Valley in Millard County, Utah. 
Appellants William J. Tuttle, Charlene W. Tuttle, Kenton Tuttle and Lori M. Tuttle 
(collectively "the Tuttles") owned a number of tracts of land in the valley. The parcels 
came to approximately 1,700 acres, which the Tuttles farmed. Since the time that the 
Tuttles purchased these parcels, they used various water rights to irrigate the majority of 
the property. 
2004, ch 267. The Legislature provided, however, that "1) injuries alleged to be caused 
by a governmental entity that occurred before July 1, 2004, be governed by the provisions 
of Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act; and (2) injuries alleged to be 
caused by a governmental entity that occurred on or after July 1, 2004, be governed by 
the provisions of Title 63, Chapter 30d, Governmental Immunity Act of Utah." Thus, 
this claim is governed by the former Act. 
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In 1992, the State Engineer announced that he was going to perform a 
groundwater survey of the Pahvant Valley and create a groundwater plan. A few years 
later, the State Engineer stated that the creation of the groundwater plan would proceed 
in three phases. In the first phase, the State Engineer would conduct a survey of the 
irrigated acreage and the water rights in the area to make sure that the areas which were 
being irrigated had sufficient water rights. If the State Engineer determined that a person 
was irrigating property without sufficient water rights, that person would receive a letter. 
If the person continued to irrigate without sufficient water rights, the State Engineer 
would take legal action. 
Because the Tuttles wanted to be sure that their water rights were sufficient, they 
went to the State Engineer's regional office in Richfield. T h e employees there told them 
that if they had not received a letter, they were entitled to continue irrigating their 
property. 
In March of 1996, the State Engineer sent a letter to property owners in the 
Pahvant Valley stating that the first phase of the survey had been completed. Those 
persons that the State Engineer had determined were irrigating illegally had received a 
letter and all of the irrigated property in the valley was now covered by valid water rights. 
The Tuttles had never received a letter, although they knew people who had received 
letters. The State Engineer had forced these people to stop irrigating. 
In 1998, the Tuttles decided to sell their properly. Based on the events of 1992 to 
1996, they advertised the land as having sufficient water rights to irrigate the property as 
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the Tuttles had historically irrigated it. They were contacted by Grant and Fern 
Ellsworth, who were California residents. The Tuttles eventually sold the property to the 
Ellsworths. 
After the Tuttles sold the property to the Ellsworths, Terry Monroe ("Monroe"), an 
employee of the State Engineer's office contacted the Ellsworths and stated that he had 
concerns about the water rights. Although Monroe stated he would work with the 
Ellsworths to address his concerns, the Ellsworths did not work with Monroe. They 
started a legal action against the Tuttles in federal court. 
Monroe later performed further analysis of the water rights and claimed that they 
were sufficient to irrigate only about 953 acres. Monroe testified to this effect at the trial 
between the Ellsworths and the Tuttles in federal court. The jury in the federal court 
returned a verdict for the Ellsworths on April 30, 2003 in the amount of $1,113,840. This 
was later supplemented by $260,184.83 in attorney's fees and costs. Although the Tuttles 
appealed this verdict, it was upheld by the Federal Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Prior to 1998, the Tuttles were the owners of two farms in the Pahvant Valley in 
Millard County, Utah. Plaintiff William Tuttle owned approximately 1,100 acres 
("William's Farm"). Plaintiff Kenton Tuttle owned approximately 640 acres ("Kenton's 
Farm"). R. at 2 - 8. During the time that the Tuttles owned the farms, they used various 
water rights to irrigate their farms. William's Farm was irrigated using water rights 67-
119, 67-137, 67-160, 67-286, 67-287, and 67-304. Kenton's Farm was irrigated using 
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water rights 67-692, 67-694, 67-708, and 67-867. R. at 2 -8. The Tuttles believed that 
they had sufficient water rights to irrigate their entire farms and did irrigate the farms for 
the entire time they owned the farms without complaint or incident. R. at 2 - 8. 
In 1992, the State Engineer announced that he intended to create a new water 
management plan for the Pahvant Valley. R. at 8. A few years later, the State Engineer 
announced that the creation of the new groundwater management plan for the Pahvant 
Valley would proceed in three phases. R. at 8. In the first phase, the State Engineer 
would conduct a survey of the irrigated acreage in the valley to determine whether the 
property was being irrigated with proper and sufficient water rights. R. at 8. If it was 
determined that property was being irrigated without a valid or sufficient water rights, the 
owner would receive a letter. If the owner continued to irrigate the property without valid 
water rights or with insufficient water rights, the State Engineer would commence legal 
action to stop the illegal irrigation. R. at 8. 
In an effort to verify the validity and sufficiency of their water rights to irrigate their 
entire farms, the Tuttles went into the State Engineer's regional office in Richfield to 
confirm that their irrigation was under valid and sufficient water rights. R. at 9 - 10. The 
Tuttles were told that if they had not received a letter, their water rights were valid and 
sufficient, and they were entitled to continue to irrigate the land as they had historically 
done. R. at 9 - 10. 
In March of 1996, the plaintiff received a letter from the State Engineer's office 
indicating that the first phase of the groundwater management plan had been completed 
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and all irrigated land in the Pahvant Valley was now covered by a valid water right. R. at 
10. A copy of this letter is included as Exhibit "A" in the Addendum. The Tuttles never 
received a letter or any other information from the State Engineer informing them that 
they did not have a valid water right sufficient to irrigate William's or Kenton's entire 
Farms. R. at 10. 
In 1998, the Tuttles decided to sell the farms. R. at 10. Based on the 
communications they had received from the State Engineer's office, the Tuttles advertised 
the land as having water rights and informed prospective buyers that there were valid and 
sufficient water rights to irrigate the entire farms. R. at 10 -11. The Tuttles transferred 
the farms to Grant Ellsworth and Fern Ellsworth ("the Ellsworths") in December 1998 via 
a §1031 exchange. The full transaction was closed on July 1, 1999. They also transferred 
all of the water rights associated with the farms to the Ellsworths. R. at 11. 
On or about December 6, 2000, defendant Terry Monroe ("Monroe") sent a letter 
to the Ellsworths informing the Ellsworths that Monroe had concerns about the water 
rights for the farms. R. at 11. Although Monroe informed the Ellsworths that he was 
willing to work with the Ellsworths to review Monroe's concerns, the Ellsworths did not 
work with Monroe to address the problems. Instead, the Ellsworths commenced a lawsuit 
against the Tuttles in the Federal District Court for the District of Utah ("the Federal 
Lawsuit"). R. at 11 - 12. Monroe later performed a further evaluation of the water rights 
which the Tuttles had transferred to the Ellsworths and determined that the water rights 
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were sufficient to irrigate only 484 acres of William's Farm and 451.2 acres of Kenton's 
Farm. R. at 135. 
At the trial of the Federal Lawsuit, Monroe testified on behalf of the Ellsworths. 
Monroe testified that the water rights were insufficient to irrigate the entire farms the 
Tuttles sold to the Ellsworths. R. at 12. Monroe testified that the water rights were 
sufficient to irrigate only 935.2 acres of the approximately 1,700 acres the Ellsworths had 
purchased from the Tuttles. R. at 134. 
The jury in the federal lawsuit found in favor of the Ellsworths. The jury reached 
its verdict on April 30, 2003. See Exhibit "A" attached to the Defendants' Memorandum 
in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. R. at 134 -35. The Federal District Court 
entered judgment against the Tuttles in the amount of $1,113,840 on July 7, 2003. The 
original judgment was for fraud, breach of warranty, wrongful conversion, breach of 
contract and for punitive damages based on the fraud. R. at 134 -135. The Federal 
District Court entered a supplemental judgment against the Tuttles in the amount of 
$260,184.83 on October 7, 2003. This judgment was for attorney's fees and costs. See 
Exhibit "B" attached to the Defendants5 Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to 
Dismiss. R. at 135. 
The Tuttles appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court, which upheld the jury's verdict 
and affirmed the judgment. R. at 135. 
The Tuttles filed their notice of claim on April 29, 2004. R. at 140. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Although the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, the trial court decided to treat 
the motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. In making its decision, however, 
the trial court did not limit itself to the allegations in the pleadings and did not accept the 
allegations of the complaint as true. The trial court therefore committed error which 
warrants reversal. 
The trial court granted the motion on two major bases. First, the trial court ruled 
that the State Engineer had no duty to provide an error-free survey of the groundwater 
resources in the Pahvant Valley. Instead, the court held that owners of water rights are 
presumed to know the amount of water which they own and can only alter water rights 
through statutory procedures. This conclusion of the trial court is error because the trial 
court failed to acknowledge that the State Engineer had no duty or authority to determine 
water rights in the Pahvant Valley on his own initiative. The State Engineer can only 
determine water rights through a court action after receiving a petition. 
Having decided to determine water rights through the groundwater survey when 
he had no duty or authority to do so, the State Engineer had a duty to perform the survey 
with reasonable care. The trial court's conclusion that the Tuttles were not entitled to an 
error-free determination of the groundwater resources is incorrect. By acting where he 
had no duty and outside his scope of authority, the State Engineer assumed a duty to 
conduct the survey with reasonable care. 
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Furthermore, having made at least two representations to the Tuttles that their 
water rights were sufficient, the State Engineer was estopped from later changing its 
position and claiming that the Tuttles (and later the Ellsworths) did not have sufficient 
water rights to irrigate the water as they had previously done. 
The second basis of the trial court's decision to grant the motion for judgment on 
the pleadings was its belief that the Tuttles5 notice of claim was untimely. The trial court 
correctly determined that the notice of claim was due within one year of the time that the 
claims arose. Although the trial court did not determine when the claims arose, it did 
determine that the claims arose before the jury returned its verdict in the federal court 
case and the notice of claim was therefore untimely. In fact, the claims against these 
defendants arose when the jury in the federal action delivered its verdict on April 30, 
2003, and the notice of claim was filed timely on April 29, 2004. 
Finally, even if the trial court was correct that the notice of claim was untimely, 
that would not affect the Tuttles' estoppel claims or its takings claims. These claims were 
not addressed in the court's decision. Because these claims were not addressed, they are 
still viable and the court's decision to dismiss the complaint was improper. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVERTING THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS INTO A MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND DID NOT APPLY 
THE PROPER STANDARD IN DECIDING THE MOTION. 
At the hearing on this matter, the trial court announced that, although the 
defendants had filed a motion to dismiss, it was granting a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. This was error. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) may be filed 
immediately after the complaint is filed in lieu of an answer. See Rule 12(a); Milton I 
Shadur, 2 Moore's Federal Practice §12.12 (Matthew Bender 2006) ("Although a 
defendant. . . may present every defense in a responsive pleading, Rule 12 permits the 
party to raise certain defenses and objections by motion filed before serving the answer"). 
A motion for judgment on the pleadings, on the other hand, must be filed "After 
the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial." Rule 12(c). 
In this matter, the pleadings had not been closed-the defendants had not filed an 
answer. The only pleading which had been made was the complaint. 
The trial court apparently converted the motion to a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings in the belief that this would allow it to consider matters outside the pleadings. 
This is, however, incorrect. '"The grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is 
7reviewed under the same standard as the grant of a motion to dismiss, i.e., we affirm the 
grant of such a motion only if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the 
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facts alleged."' Miller v. Gastronomy. Inc.. 2005 U T App. 80, ^|6, 110 P.3d 144 (quoting 
Thimmes v. Utah State Univ.. 2001 U T App 93, ^|4, 22 P.3d 257). 
In addition, in a considering a motion to dismiss, the trial court must construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences 
in his favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & light Co.. 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991); Russell v. 
Standard Corp.. 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995). 
At the hearing of this matter, the trial court considered many matters which were 
outside the pleadings, particularly the basis for the jury's decision in the federal court 
action. The trial court also did not construe the allegations in the light most favorable to 
the Tuttles, but relied in large part on the decisions made in the federal courts. This was 
error and requires the reversal of the trial court's decision in this matter. 
II. THE STATE ENGINEER HAD NO DUTY OR AUTHORITY 
TO CONDUCT THE GROUNDWATER SURVEY, IMPOSE 
A GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT PLAN OR 
DETERMINE WATER RIGHTS IN THE PAHVANT 
VALLEY. 
In 1992, the State Engineer announced that he intended to conduct a groundwater 
survey of the Pahvant Valley. A few years later, the State Engineer announced that the 
groundwater survey would proceed in three stages. The first was that the State Engineer 
would review the water rights in the valley and determine whether all of the property 
which was being irrigated was covered by valid water rights. If the State Engineer 
determined that any property was being irrigated without a valid water right, the State 
Engineer would first send a notice to the person irrigating the property. If the person 
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continued to irrigate without a valid water right, the State Engineer would commence 
legal action to stop the illegal irrigation. 
This scheme was illegal for two reasons. First, the State Engineer had no right to 
conduct the groundwater survey. Second, the procedure proposed by the State Engineer 
allowed him, in effect, to determine water rights outside of a district court action in 
violation of Utah law. Thus, the State Engineer exceeded his authority in conducting the 
groundwater survey in the Pahvant Valley. 
A. The State Engineer Had No Authority to Conduct a 
Groundwater Survey or Impose a Groundwater 
Management Plan. 
The State Engineer exceeded his authority in creating the groundwater 
management plan in the first place. It is axiomatic that the State Engineer only has the 
power that is delegated to him in the statute. Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 
76 Utah 243, 289 P. 116 (1930). The State Engineer's authority and duties are described 
in Utah Code Ann. §73-2-1 (2006). In this statute, the State Engineer is given wide 
authority to take such actions as: 1) providing administrative supervision of waters and 
water rights, 2) making rules to govern water issues, 3) bringing suit to enjoin or prevent 
violations of water law, 4) upon request of a irrigation district, survey land proposed for 
annexation into the district to determine the amount of water which can be beneficially 
used on the land, and 5) establishing water distribution systems and their boundaries. 
Nowhere in this statute, however, is the State Engineer authorized or required to 
perform a survey of the water rights in a particular area and to impose a groundwater 
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management plan on the area. In this regard, it is important to note that in the 2006 
General Session of the Utah Legislature, a bill was proposed which would have 
authorized the State Engineer to create groundwater management plans. See draft 
legislation, attached as Exhibit "B" in the Addendum. Although this bill was not passed, 
the fact that it was considered necessary indicates that the State Engineer was not required 
to perform this survey of the Pahvant Valley and had no authority to impose the 
groundwater plan in the Pahvant Valley. 
B. The State Engineer m u s t Determine Water Rights Through 
an Adjudication. 
Utah Code Ann. §73-4-1 (a) (2006), prescribes the procedure the State Engineer 
must follow in determining water rights. That section states: 
Upon a verified petition to the state engineer, signed by five or more or a 
majority of water users upon any stream or water source, requesting the 
investigation of the relative rights of the various claimants to the waters of 
such stream or water source, it shall be the duty of the state engineer, if 
upon such investigation he finds the facts and conditions are such as to 
justify a determination of said rights, to file in the district court an action to 
determine the various rights. In any suit involving water rights the court 
may order an investigation and survey by the state engineer of all the water 
rights on the source or system involved. 
The first relevant feature of the system for determining water rights is that the State 
Engineer may not commence a determination of water rights himself. He cannot act until 
he has received a verified petition signed by five or more water users or a majority of the 
water users in an area. In the case of the Pahvant Valley, however, it appears that the 
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State Engineer violated this limitation and commenced the determination of water rights 
on his own initiative.2 
A second important feature of the procedure for determining water rights is that, if 
the State Engineer receives a proper petition, he must commence an action in the district 
court to determine the water rights. In this matter, the State Engineer determined the 
water rights in the Pahvant Valley without any involvement from the courts.3 
Clearly, the State Engineer had no right or authority to conduct the determination 
of water rights as he did in the Pahvant Valley. 
III. EVEN IF THE STATE ENGINEER HAD AUTHORITY TO 
PERFORM THE GROUNDWATER SURVEY IN THE 
PAHVANT VALLEY, HE WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION 
TO DO SO AND HE HAD A DUTY TO PERFORM THE 
SURVEY WITH REASONABLE CARE. 
Utah courts have consistently found that when a person (including a governmental 
agency) undertakes an action which the person has no duty to perform, and another relies 
on that action, the person must perform the act with ordinary or reasonable care. 
For instance, in Nelson ex. rel. Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 
1996), a mother took her child to a park in Salt Lake City. The park was adjacent to the 
2In fact, it appears that the State Engineer violated this provision twice in this matter. 
The first time was in 1992 when the State Engineer decided to commence the initial survey and 
groundwater plan. The second time was in 2000 when the State Engineer, through Terry 
Monroe, contacted the Ellsworths and told them that they did not have the water claimed. 
3The State Engineer also violated this provision in 2000 when Terry Monroe informed 
the Ellsworths that they did not have the water rights which they believed they had received in 
the transaction with the Tuttles. The State Engineer made this determination without the 
involvement of a court. 
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Jordan River and the child went through a hole in the fence, fell into the river and 
suffered permanent injuries. The mother sued and the city defended on the basis that it 
was immune. The trial court granted the city's motion for summary judgment and the 
mother appealed. 
On appeal, the city once again asserted that it was immune. The Utah Supreme 
Court disagreed. Although the court did not determine whether the City had a duty to 
erect a fence between the park and the river, the court stated that "once an entity 
undertakes to provide that protection, it is obligated to use reasonable care in providing 
it." ML at 573. See also DCR. Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.. 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983) ("the 
defendant's tort liability is not based upon breach of contract, but rather upon violation of 
the legal duty independently imposed as a result of what the defendant undertook to do 
with relation to the plaintiffs interests55); 57A Am Jur. 2d Negligence §208 (1989) ("Where 
one undertakes an act which he has no duty to perform and another reasonably relies 
upon that undertaking, the act must generally be performed with ordinary or reasonable 
care55). 
In this matter, the State Engineer had no duty or authority to conduct the survey of 
water rights or create a groundwater management plan in the Pahvant Valley. Having 
decided to do so, however, he was required to use ordinary or reasonable care in his 
actions. The trial court was obligated to accept the allegations of the complaint that the 
State Engineer failed to exercise reasonable care in making this survey and creating the 
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groundwater management plan. The court should therefore not have granted the State's 
motion to dismiss. 
IV. THE DEFENDANTS WERE ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT 
THE TUTTLES AND THE ELLSWORTHS HAD WATER 
RIGHTS SUFFICIENT TO IRRIGATE THE FARMS. 
The defendants made at least two representations to the Tuttles that their water 
rights were sufficient to irrigate their farms. The Tuttles relied on those representations 
and the defendants were estopped from denying those water rights after the sale to the 
Ellsworths. In order to establish equitable estoppel, a plaintiff must establish three 
elements: 
(1) a party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act that is inconsistent 
with a later-asserted claim; (2) reasonable action or inaction by a second 
party, taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or 
failure to act; (3) injury to the second party resulting from allowing the first 
party to repudiate its statement, admission, act, or failure to act. 
Mendez v. Department of Social Services. 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App. 1991). 
In order to establish equitable estoppel against a governmental agency, the plaintiff 
must establish two additional elements: 
(1) [the estoppel is] necessary to prevent manifest injustice; and (2) the 
exercise of governmental powers will not be impaired as a result of the 
application of estoppel. 
Id 
The Tuttles1 equitable estoppel claim meets all of the requirements established by 
the courts. The defendants represented to the Tuttles that they had sufficient water rights 
to irrigate their farms. The defendants made this representation in at least two ways. 
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First, when the Tuttles visited the State Engineer's Richfield regional office the defendants' 
employees informed the Tuttles that if they had not received a letter, their water rights 
were sufficient. Second, the defendants sent the Tuttles a letter which informed the 
Tuttles that the first phase of the review of the Pahvant Valley had been completed and 
everyone who had been found to be using water in violation had been notified. The 
Tuttles had not received a notice that they were in violation. 
The Tuttles relied on the defendants' representations when they sold their property 
to the Ellsworths. Based on what they had been told by the defendants, the Tuttles 
informed the Ellsworths that there were sufficient water rights to irrigate both of the 
farms. 
In 2000, however, the defendants unilaterally and without notice changed their 
position on the water rights. At that time, they informed the Ellsworths that the water 
rights were insufficient to irrigate the entire farms. As a result of this change in position, 
the Ellsworths sued the Tuttles and obtained a judgment against the Tuttles of over 
SI, 400,000. 
In addition, application of estoppel is necessary in this matter to prevent a manifest 
injustice. The Tuttles sold the farms in good faith in the belief that they had sufficient 
water rights to irrigate all of the farms. Two years later, after the Tuttles had sold the 
property, the defendants changed their minds about the water rights and helped the 
Ellsworths obtain a judgment of over $1,400,000 against the Tuttles. It would be 
manifestly unjust to allow the defendants to treat the Tuttles in this manner. 
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Finally, the exercise of governmental powers would not be impaired by the 
application of estoppel in this matter. The Tuttles are not asking for an order prohibiting 
the defendants from making determinations of water rights in proper circumstances. 
They are asking, however, that when the defendants act without statutory authorization to 
make a determination of water rights, come to a conclusion regarding a party's water 
rights and then change that determination without giving the affected party notice or an 
opportunity to be heard, the defendants should bear the costs of their actions instead of 
passing those costs on to the holders of the water rights. 
Because all of these matters must be deemed to be admitted in a motion to dismiss 
or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court erred in dismissing the Tuttles5 
estoppel claims. 
V. THE TUTTLES COMPLIED WITH THE NOTICE OF CLAIM 
PROVISIONS OF THE ACT. 
The trial court's next basis for granting the defendants' motion to dismiss was the 
court's finding that Tuttles failed to file a notice of claim within one year of the time their 
claims arose. 
At the time this matter arose, the Act provided that a notice of claim must be filed 
within one year of the time a cause of action arises. See Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12. The 
Act also provided that "A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if 
the claim were against a private person begins to run." Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11(1). 
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The question is therefore when would the statute of limitations have begun to run against 
a private person for these same claims? 
"limitation periods begin to run when a cause of action has accrued, which occurs 
upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." Bank 
One Utah v. West Jordan City. 2002 UT App. 271, ^ [8, 54 P.3d 135 (internal quotations 
omitted). In this case, the happening of the last event necessary to complete the Tuttles1 
cause of action against the defendants was the entry of the jury verdict against the Tuttles 
in the Federal lawsuit. Up to that time, although the Tuttles believed that the defendants 
had acted improperly, they had suffered no damages as a result of the defendants' 
misconduct and could not maintain a cause of action against the defendants. It is 
black-letter law that no cause of action exists until some damages have resulted from the 
defendants* actions. See Valley Colour. Inc. v. Beuchert Builders. Inc.. 944 P.2d 361, 364 
(Utah 1997) ("Because Valley Colour did not sustain, and therefore could not have 
demonstrated, special damages until after the sale by Central Bank, it could not have 
maintained its suit to conclusion until that time"); 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions 
§151 ("A cause of action does not accrue for the purpose of a statute of limitations until all 
the elements are present, including damages.") 
The defendants claimed, and the trial court apparently believed, that the Tuttles 
should have filed their notice of claim in 1998 or 1999 based on representations they 
made in the Federal Court case. They claim that the statute of limitations began to run 
from this time. In making this argument, however, the defendants confused the 
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Ellsworths' claims against the Tuttles with the Tuttles1 separate and distinct claims against 
the defendants. Tha t the statute of limitations began to run on the Ellsworths5 claims 
against the Tuttles does not mean that the statute of limitations began to run on the 
Tuttles' claims against the defendants. Until there was a verdict in the federal lawsuit, the 
Tuttles had suffered no damages from the defendants' actions and the Tuttles had no 
cause of action against the defendants. 
The defendants also claimed that the statute of limitations would have begun to 
run from Monroe's August 21 , 1998 letter expressing his concerns about the Diesel Well. 
This letter did not and could not have alerted the Tuttles to any problem with the well. It 
stated only that the State could not see the well in its database and asked for help in 
identifying the associated water right. It did not state or even imply that the Diesel Well 
was not a valid water right or that the water rights was insufficient to irrigate the property 
the Tuttles were irrigating. This letter cannot constitute the happening of the last event 
necessary to complete any potential cause of action because, at that time, the Tuttles had 
not suffered any damages. Only when the jury verdict was entered against the Tuttles did 
the Tuttles suffer damages as a result of the defendants' misconduct. 
The Tuttles suffered no harm in this matter until the Federal Court jury rendered 
its verdict on April 30, 2003 at the earliest. The Tuttles sent their notice of claim on 
April, 29, 2004, which was within the one-year time period established in the Act. The 
notice was timely and the trial court should not have granted the motion to dismiss on this 
basis. 
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VI. EVEN IF THE NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS UNTIMELY 
FILED, THE TUTTLES' ESTOPPEL AND TAKINGS 
CLAIMS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED. 
Finally, the trial court erred in dismissing all of the Tuttles' claims on the bases 
described in the court's order. That order states that the State Engineer did not have a 
duty to perform an error-free survey of the water rights. Even if that were true, this would 
only dispose of the Tuttles' negligence claims. 
The trial court's other basis for dismissing the action was that the failed to file a 
notice of claim within the time required by the Act. This would only affect claims which 
are subject to the Act. The Tuttles asserted an equitable estoppel claim, which his not 
subject to the Act. See Bowles v. State ex. rel. Dept. of Transportation, 652 P.2d 1345, 
1346 (Utah 1982) ("governmental immunity is not a defense to equitable claims"); El 
Rancho Enters.. Inc.. v. Murray City Corp.. 565 P.2d 778, 779 (Utah 1977) ("The 
common law exception to governmental immunity pertaining to equitable claims has long 
been recognized in this jurisdiction.") 
The Tuttles also raised a takings claim under Article 1, section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution, which is also not subject to the Act. See Colman v. State Land Board. 795 
P.2d 622, 634 (Utah 1990) ("In sum, article I, section 22 needs no legislation to activate it; 
it is mandatory and obligatory as it is"). 
It was therefore error for the trial court to dismiss all of the Tuttles5 claims on the 
bases described in the court's order. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in converting the defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings, addressing matters outside the pleadings and failing to 
accept the allegations of the complaint as true. State Engineer had no duty or authority to 
conduct a survey of the groundwater rights in the Pahvant Valley and impose and 
groundwater management plan unless property owners filed a petition. Because the State 
Engineer acted where he had no duty, he had an obligation to conduct the survey with 
reasonable care. The trial court erred in holding that the State Engineer did not have a 
duty to the Tuttles in conducting the survey and creating the groundwater management 
plan. In addition, all of the elements of estoppel are present in this case, and the trial 
court erred in dismissing the estoppel claim. The trial court also erred in holding that the 
notice of claim was untimely. The notice of claim was filed within one year of the time 
the jury in the federal court imposed damages, which was the final step necessary for a 
claim against these defendants. Finally, it was error for the trial court to dismiss the 
Tuttles5 estoppel and takings claims on the bases described in the trial court's order. For 
all of these reasons, this court should reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this <^ day of July, 2006. 
Keith M. Backman 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Dear Water User. 
The purpose of this letter is to keep you apprised of the progress 
ve are making on the implementation of the ground-water management 
plan for Pahvant Valley. 
At the last public aieeting I held with you on February 2*. 1554, an 
eight point "Proposed Ground-water Management Plan for Pahvant 
Valley" (Plan) was distributed *nd a comment period was set. At 
that meeting, I stated that the Plan would be phased in over a 
period of three to four years and that the ongoing acreage survey 
would be completed. 
Based on the comments received, the firxC part of the Plan was 
implemented with the promulgation of a new ^Appropriation Policy 
for Pahvant Valley" on March 2, 1554 The new policy went into 
effect on April 1, 1554. 
Cooanonts were also received dealing with the proposal to realign 
some of the ground-water districts. The comments on this proposal 
were overwhelmingly negative. Aa a result, the boundaries of the 
ground-weter districts were not changed. Implicit in this decision 
is that no water right shall be moved cut of the district in which 
it is presently located 
During the spring of 1554, the acreage survey was completed and all 
water users who were irrigating land without a water right were 
notified As a result of this effort and with the cooperation of 
water users, all irrigated land* are now covered by valid water 
rights — — ^"~ — ' • 
Beginning in the summer ol 1594 and continuing into the summer of 
1555, a cataloging of veils was conducted by the Distribution 
section of the Division. As part of the cataloging, a survey was 
also made to determine the number of uncontrolled flowing wells 
that were wasting water. The result of this effort was an updated 
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'accounting of all significant irrigation wells and flowing wells in 
the valley. In reviewing the uncontrolled flowing wells, it was 
determined that the amount of water discharged by these wells was 
not significant. 
The Distribution section also held meetings with water users to 
assess the need to establish a commissioner-operated, water user-
funded distribution system and begin the n->t°.ring of wells. The 
result of these meetings was that the implementation of a 
distribution system and the metering of wells would be delayed to 
see if the changes resulting from the acreage compilation would 
resolve the problem of declining ground-water levels. 
I still remain committed to the goal of reducing ground-water 
withdrawals to an annual average of about 60,000 acre-feet per 
year, which is considered to be the safe yield of the valley's 
aquifer system. If this can not be achieved through acreage 
compliance, then additional action may be necessary. Over the past 
three years, ground-water levels (as represented by the U.S. 
Geological Survey continuous monitoring well near Flowell) show 
continued declines. We will continue to monitor ground-water 
levels and withdrawals, but I cannot rule out the future 
distribution of water based on priority rJ.ite, the establishment of 
a distribution system with a commissioner, or the metering of 
wells. If forced to distribute water; by priority date, I would 
establish the distribution system and order the metering of wells 
first, then phase in the pumpage reductions over several years to 
allow water users a reasonable amount of time to make operational 
and financial adjustments. 
Again, I would like-to thank you for your past cooperation in the 
development and implementation of this Plan, and I look forward'to 
working with you in the future. 
Sincerely, 
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1 GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT PLAN 
2 2006 GENERAL SESSION 
3 STATE OF UTAH 
5 LONG TITLE 
6 General Description: 
7 This bill authorizes the state engineer to create a groundwater management plan. 
8 Highlighted Provisions: 
9 This bill: 
10 • authorizes the state engineer to create a groundwater management plan for any 
11 groundwater basin or aquifer, 
12 • allows conjunctive management of hydrologically connected ground and surface 
13 water; 
14 • describes the purpose and effect of a groundwater management plan; 
15 • outlines the requirements for creating a groundwater management plan; 
16 • eliminates a provision addressing administration of groundwater rights; and 
17 • makes technical changes. 
IS Monies Appropriated in this Bill: 
19 None 
20 Other Special Clauses: 
21 None 
22 Utah Code Sections Affected: 
23 AMENDS: 
24 73-5-1, as last amended by Chapter 41, Laws of Utah 2000 
25 ENACTS: 
26 73-5-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
27 = = = = = = = = = = ^ ^ 
28 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
29 Section 1. Section 73-5-1 is amended to read: 
30 73-5-1. Appointment of water commissioners ~ Procedure — Hearing to 
31 determine adequacy of underground water supply, 
32 (1) (a) I£ in the judgment of the state engineer or the district court, it is necessary to 
2GG6FL-0227/G10 10-24-05 DRAFT 
33 appoint a water commissioner for the distribution of water from any river system or water 
34 source, the commissioner shall be appointed for a four-year term by the state engineer. 
35 (b) The state engineer shall determine whether ail or a part of a river system or other 
36 water source shall be served by a commissioner, and if only a part is to be served, the state 
37 engineer shall determine the boundaries of that part. 
38 (c) The state engineer may appoint: 
39 (i) more than one commissioner to distribute water from all or a part of a water source; 
40 or 
41 (ii) a single commissioner to distribute water from several separate and distinct water 
42 sources. 
43 (2) (a) The state engineer shall consult with the water users before appointing a 
44 commissioner. The form of consultation and notice to be given shall be determined by the state 
45 engineer so as to best suit local conditions, while providing for full expression of majority 
46 opinion. 
47 (b) If a majority of the water users agree upon a qualified person to be appointed as 
48 water commissioner, the duties the person shall perform, and the compensation the person shall 
49 receive, and they make recommendations to the state engineer on the appointment, duties, and 
50 compensation, the state engineer shall act in accordance with their recommendations. 
51 (c) If a majority of water users do not agree on the appointment, duties, or 
52 compensation, the state engineer shall make a determination for them. 
53 (3) (a) £1} The salary and expenses of the commissioner and all other expenses of 
54 distribution, including printing, postage, equipment, water users' expenses, and any other 
55 expenses considered necessary by the state engineer, shall be borne pro rata by the users of 
56 water from the river system or water source in accordance with a schedule to be fixed by the 
57 state engineer, 
58 £ii} The schedule shall be based on the established rights of each water user, and the 
59 pro rata share shall be paid by each water user to the state engineer on or before May 1 of each 
60 year. 
61 (b) The payments shall be deposited in the Water Commissioner Fund created in 
62 Section 73-5-1.5. 
63 (c) If a water user fails to pay the assessment as provided by Subsection (3)(a), the state 
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64 engineer may do any or all of the following: 
65 (I) create a lien upon the water right affected by filing a notice of lien in the office of 
66 the county recorder in the county where the water is diverted and bring an action to enforce the 
67 lien; 
68 (ii) forbid the use of water by the delinquent water user or the delinquent water user's 
69 successors or assignees, while the default continues; or 
70 (iii) bring an action in the district court for the unpaid expense and salary, 
71 (d) In any action brought to collect any unpaid assessment or to enforce any lien under 
72 this section, the delinquent water user shall be liable for the amount of the assessment, interest, 
73 any penalty, and for all costs of collection, including all court costs and a reasonable attorney 
74 fee. 
75 (4) (a) A commissioner may be removed by the state engineer for cause. 
76 (b) The users of water from any river system or water source may petition the district 
77 court for the removal of a commissioner and after notice and hearing, the court may order the 
78 removal of the commissioner and direct the state engineer to appoint a successor. 
79 [(5) (a) In addition to the power granted to the state ciigiueei to appoint water 
80 commissioners for the distribution of water, the state engineer may, at any time, hold a hearing, 
81 oi upon a petition signed by not less than one-third of the users of underground waters in any 
82 area as defined by the state engineer, shall hold a hearing, to determine whether the 
83 uiidcrgioiLLid water supply within such aiea Is adequate for the existing claims.] 
84 [(b) (i) Notice of the hearing shall be given in a form and maimer which, in the 
85 judgment of the state engineer, best suits local conditions.] 
86 [(H) The state engineer may make a full Investigation and provide findings for the 
87 hearing.] 
88 [(e) If the findings show that the water supply Is inadequate for existing claims, the 
89 state engineer shall divide, or request that the water commissioner divide, the water supply 
90 among the claimants entitled to the water in aceerdance with their respective rights:] 
91 Section 2. Section 73-5-15 is enacted to read: 
92 73-5-15. Groundwater management plan. 
93 (1) As used m this section: 
94 (a) "Critical management area" means a groundwater basin in which the groundwater 
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95 withdrawals consistently exceed the safe yield. 
96 Ooi) "Safe yield* means the amount of groundwater that can be withdrawn from a 
97 groundwater basin over a period of time without exceeding the long term recharge of the basin 
98 or unreasonably affecting the basin's physical and chemical integrity. 
99 f2) (a) The state engineer may regulate groundwater withdrawals withm a specific 
100 groundwater basin by adopting a groundwater management plan in accordance with this section 
101 for any groundwater basin or aquifer or combination of hydrologically connected groundwater 
102 basins or aquifers. 
103 (h) The objectives of a groundwater management plan are to: 
104 (i) limit groundwater withdrawals to safe yield; 
105 (ii) protect the physical integrity of the aquifer, and 
106 (iii) protect water quality. 
107 (3) fa) In developing a groundwater management plan, the state engineer may consider 
108 ffl the hydrology of the groundwater basin; 
109 (ii) the physical characteristics of the groundwater basin: 
110 (Hi) the relationship between surface water and groundwater, including whether the 
111 groundwater should be managed in conjunction with physically connected surface waters: 
112 (iv) the geographic spacing and location of groundwater withdrawals: 
113 fv) water quality; 
114 (vi> local well interference: and 
115 (vip other relevant factors. 
116 (b) The state engineer shall base the provisions of a groundwater management plan on 
117 the principles of prior appropriation. 
118 fc> ffl The state engineer shall use the best available scientific method to determine 
119 safe yield. 
120 fii> As hvdrologic conditions change or additional information becomes available, safe 
121 yield determinations made bv the state engineer may be revised bv following the procedures 
122 listed in Subsection (5\ 
123 fd) The state engineer shall adopt a groundwater management plan for a groundwater 
124 basin if more than one-third of the water right owners in the groundwater basin request that the 
125 state engineer adopt a groundwater management plan. 
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126 (4) (z) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(c\ the withdrawal of water from a 
127 groundwater basin shall be limited to the basin's safe yield 
128 fifl Before limiting withdrawals in a groundwater basin to safe yield, the state engineer 
129 shall: 
130 (A) determine the groundwater basin's safe vield: and 
131 (B) adopt a groundwater management plan for the groundwater basin. 
132 (iii\ If the state engineer determines that groundwater withdrawals in a groundwater 
133 basin exceed the safe yield, the state engineer shall regulate groundwater rights in that 
134 groundwater basin based on the priority date of the water rights under the groundwater 
135 management plan, unless a voluntary arrangement exists under Subsection (4)fc) that requires a 
136 different distribution. 
137 fb) When adopting a groundwater management plan for a critical management area, the 
138 state engineer mav, based on economic and other impacts on the local community caused bv 
139 the implementation of safe yield limits on withdrawals, allow gradual implementation of the 
140 groundwater management plan. 
141 (c) 0) Water users in a groundwater basin mav agree to participate in a voluntary 
142 arrangement for managing withdrawals at any time, either before or after a determination that 
143 groundwater withdrawals exceed the groundwater basin's safe vield 
144 fip An arrangement under Subsection f4)fc)(i) mav be created bv the participating 
145 water users under the state engineers supervision. 
146 Cm) A voluntary arrangement under Subsection (4>(cVi1 shall be consistent with other 
147 law. 
148 fiv) The adoption of a voluntary arrangement under this Subsection f4)(c) by less than 
149 all of the water users in a groundwater basin does not affect the rights of water users who do 
150 not agree to the voluntary arrangement. 
151 (5) To adopt a groundwater management plan, the state engineer shall: 
152 fa) hold one or more public meetings in the geographic area where the groundwater is 
153 located, after providing 30 days' notice of the meeting, to: 
154 (i) address the need for a groundwater management plan, including the reasons whv the 
155 groundwater management plan should be adopted: 
156 (jp provide and gather information and present any data, studies, or reports concerning 
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157 the groundwater resources involved in the groundwater management plan: 
158 fiii) address safe vield and any other subject that may be included in a potential 
159 groundwater management plan: and 
160 (iv} outline the estimated administrative costs to groundwater users: 
161 (b) provide notice of the proposed plan and request comments in accordance with 
162 Subsection (6): 
163 (c) receive and consider written comments concerning the proposed groundwater 
164 management plan from any person for a period determined bvthe state engineer of not less 
165 than 60 days after the dav on which the notice required bv Subsection fflfal is given: and 
166 (d) provide notice of the adoption of the groundwater management plan. 
167 (6) A notice required bv this section shall be provided bv: 
168 (a) publishing the notice once a week for a period of two successive weeks in a 
169 newspaper of general circulation in the county where the groundwater aquifer is located: and 
170 (b) publishing the notice conspicuously on the state engineer's Internet website, 
171 (7) A groundwater management plan may be amended in the same manner as a 
172 groundwater management plan may be adopted under this section. 
173 (8) The existence of a groundwater management plan does not preclude any otherwise 
174 eligible person from filing any application or challenging any decision made bv the state 
175 engineer within the affected groundwater basin. 
176 (9) fa) A person affected bv a groundwater management plan may challenge any aspect 
177 of the groundwater management plan bv filing a complaint in the district coun for anv county 
178 in which the groundwater basin is found 
179 (h) Notwithstanding Subsection (8). a person may only challenge a state engineer's 
180 conclusions concerning the safe vield of a groundwater basin in the manner provided bv 
181 Subsection (9)(z\ 
182 (10) A groundwater management plan adopted or amended in accordance with this 
183 section is exempt from the requirements in Title 63, Chapter 46a Utah Administrative 
184 Rulemaking Act 
185 fll) Recharge and recovery projects permitted under Chapter 3b are exempted from 
186 this section* 
187 (12) fa) A groundwater management plan adopted by the state engineer before May 1. 
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188 2006 remains in force and has the same legal effect as it had on the day on which it was 
189 adopted by the state engineer* 
190 (h) An amendment to a groundwater manaecmcnt plan that existed before May 1. 
191 2006, that is adopted on or after May 1,2006, is subiect to this section's provisions. 
